EXAMPLES
Herc arc some figures which exemplify the difference that I am talking about (Table 1 ) : Report 1994, p. 162, p. 220 A~ the examples in Table 1 show, the value of one country's money in relation to another country's money can be calculated using two different methods and expressed in two different rates --exchange rates and PPP rates. For example, the actual exchange rate between Indian rupees and U.S. dollars "shows" that Indian GNP per capita wa~ 310 dollars in 1992. ln contra~t. scientific mca~urcmcnt of purcha~ing power parity (PPP) "shows" that Indian GNP per capita wa~ 1210 dollars, i.e. four times a~ much a~ shown in terms of exchange rates. OECD countries, however --like the USA, Germany, UK and Australia --have exchange rates to the U.S. dollar that arc very similar to the relative purcha~ing power rates of the currencies.
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Which of the two rates (exchange rate versus PPP rate) is the correct one? When we a.:;k the question: "What is the value of rupees in relation to the value of U.S. dollars?", we obtain two sharply different answers (e.g., "310" and "1210" for GNP per capita in the above). That constitutes a puzzle --not for practitioners, because they use exchange rates, but for scientists. It can be observed that exchange rates arc real, in the sense that they arc being used by money traders and traders of goods and services. The PPP rate, on the other hand, is scientifically arrived at. Docs that mean that PPP rates arc not real? Such a conclusion would be untenable. On the contrary, PPP rates arc real a.:; well --they arc ba.:;cd on carefully established methods of mea.:;uremcnt.
The situation is one of a dual standard or a double standard --namely, we have two standards for evaluating the same object. The object to be evaluated is the relationship between money A and money B (the cvaluandum) and the two conflicting standards arc exchange rate (standard 1) and PPP rate (standard 2). In order to deal with this discrepancy in a comprehensive manner, we require some theory.
TYPES OF THEORY REQUIRED
In order to address the problem a.:; outlined, we require four broad types of theory, namely: (l) mca.:;urcmcnt theory --what is it that we arc mca.:;uring? In this study I will not attempt a comprehensive treatment of th ese issues. Inst ead, I will focus on two contentions, that: (l) the discrepancies between the two mca.:;urcmcnt methods arc systematic (non-random) and correlate with the global center-periphery structure (empirical claim); and (2) this situation constitutes a form of exploitation (normati ve claim) .
HOW PPP RATES ARE CALCULATED
The mca.:;urcmcnt of PPP exchange rate (purcha.:;ing power parity rates) ha.:; some similarity with inflation mca.:;urcmcnt. The method consists of the following: (a) a "ba.:;ket of goods and services" is defin ed ( a.:; in inflation mca.:;ur cmcnt); (b) prices for this "ba .:;kc t " arc collected in the countries around the world --e.g., in country l in rubles, in country 2 in rupees, in country 3 in yuan, etc.; (c) the prices for the "basket" in th e different countries arc compared and permit the calculation of purchasing power parity rates (PPP rates). The World Bank developed and refined this methodology during the past decades to a point where it is as solid as inflation mca-.urcmcnt.
The following is a more detailed description, with examples, of the method used for calculating PPP rates. The examples arc taken from a handbook by the main authors who developed this method (Kravis, Heston, Summers 1978).
Step (a)--Defining the "Basket"
The first step is to prepare a standardized list ("basket") of goods and services whose prices arc to be compared across countries. (NOTE: the result.., for GDP are the purcha..,ing power parity rates between the U.S. dollar and the French franc and between the U.S. dollar and the Colombian peso in 1970)
Step ( This investigation may seem abstract, but it has great practical relevance. Th ere is an entire chorus of economists who keep repeating that the exchange rates of poor countries are overvalued. The llvIF, in particular, has, over the past two decades and as part of its "Structural Adjustment Programs" (SAPs), forced many countri es to devalue th eir currencies, using the argument that the currency was "overvalued ". This practice has important practical implications for the countries and people affected by SAPs. Furthermore, it reveals two things: (1) the IMF ( and the chorus of economists referred to) has a "theory of value" regarding exchange rates. This theory may be largely implicit , but it is there, or else they could not arrive at the evaluative judgm ent that "exchang e rat e of country X is overvalued". And: (2) value theory of exchange rates is of great practical relevance. Whereas most economists agree with the view that the currencies oflowincome countries tend to be overvalued, if anything, I claim the opposite, that the currencies of low-income countri es tend to be undervalued.
[ (1) for the countries of the core of the world system (OECD countries) exchange rat es (method 1) and purcha..,ing power rates (method 2) do not differ at all or differ relatively little.
(2) for the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system (non-OECD countries) exchange rates (method 1) and purchasing power rates (method 2) yield significantly different results. The difference can be stated in two ways --namely, either: exchange rate values arc lower than PPP values, or: the purchasing p owcr value of the country's currency is greater than the exchange rate value. (3) overall, for all countries, it can be observed that the discrepancy tends to be greatest for the poorest countries and least for the richest countries. My Table 1 shows only eleven countries. However, when all countries arc examined, the same correlation emerges. Statistical testing of these observations leads to the following results: (4) for all countries, there is a statistical correlation between the country's GNP per capita and the discrepancy between exchange rates and PPP rates. In other word~, the poorer the country, the lower will be the exchange rate value of its currency in relation to the PPP value of its currency. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CORRELATION
In the context of world system theory and related theories (structural theory, imperialism theory), the observed correlation means that a country's socio-economic status in the world system and the relative value of the country's money within the world system are related. Topdog countries tend to have "hard" or "strong" currencies (i.e. valuable currencies); underdog countries tend to have "soft" or "weak" currencies (i.e. less valuable currencies). The general power/wealth gradient in the world system can thus be found once more in the value structure of global money.
In terms of causality, it may be asked whether the global power/wealth structure determines the global money structure or vice versa. I assume that both causalities exist. The global power/wealth structure contributes to the global money structure and th e global structure of money feeds back into the perpetuation of th e global power/w ealth structure.
VALUE THEORY (NORMATIVE DISCUSSION)
I will now shift from empirical observation to normative reasoning (theory of value). How can we evaluate this situation?
The discussion can be organized around two diametrically oppos cd evaluative (normativ e) propositions, namely:
The exchang e rates oflow-incomc countries tend to be overvalued.
Proposition (2) : The exchan ge rates oflow-incomc countries tend to be undervalued.
Let's examine both propositions.
THE OVER-VALUATION ARGUMENT
The over-valuation argument is common and is being used by the IlvIF, as mentioned earlier. In order to arrive at a verdict of "over-valuation " of a currenc y, the jud ging mind must have two things, namely, (a) certain kinds of factual inform ation and (b) a nonna tive standard by which to evaluate the facts; or an evaluation method which impli es a nonnative standard. What nonnative standar d or "yardstick" is being applied by experts who reach the verd ict of "overva lued"?
In practice the "Structural Adjustment Programs" of the IlvIF tend to impose conditions on various countries --conditions which tend to include stipulations about currency. "Typical conditionalitics might be: the borrower's budget or balance of payments deficit must be reduced by x percent within one year; ... the currency must be devalued by x percent within six months, etc." (Brown 1993: 122) . There is thus a great conc ern for balancing the government budget and balancing the balance of payments. Th e standard by which a currency is evaluated is the balancing of the balance of pa yments. The connection between this standard and the judgment of "ovcrvaluation" is stated, for example, in the following:
"The currencies of most developing countries arc overvalued ... When exchange rates arc fixed, a surplus demand for foreign currency tends to develop, which must be controlled ... " (Lachmann 1994: 196; my translation.) The balancing of the balance of payments is thus a major "yardstick " with which the currencies of poor countries arc evaluated. (It should be noted that the same yardstick is being applied when the currencies of high-income countries arc evaluated.) This may be a valid standard. However, I contend that the following is also a valid standard, even though this argument may seem paradoxical at first.
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THE UNDER-VALUATION ARGUMENT
When a low-income country (with a structurally distort ed currency value, sec Table 1) trades with a high-income country, the high-income country gains a quantity of real value which docs not show up in any account and the low-income country loses a quantit y of real value which docs not show up in any account. In colonial times, traders may have exchanged cheap glass beads for valuable ivory. Both sides agreed to the deal. Similarly, a low-income country may mak e a deal with a high-incom e country and the deal is balanced in mon etary terms at the prevailing exchange rates. How ever, a quantity of real value is extract ed from the low-income country in this deal which docs not show up in any account.
The nonnative standard in this argument is "real value". I mca-.urc "real va lue" in terms of purcha-.ing power parity (PPP). On this ba-.is, it can be argued that the currencies of the low-incom e countries tend to be underva lued. Herc is an example.
First, let's eliminate the theoret ical possiblity of complete autarky of two countries. In this situation there is no trade and no international money exchange. PPP rates can be mca-.urcd, but there arc no exchange rates. This situation is of no practical int erest.
Next, let us examine a situation of balanced trade between country LIC (low-income country) and country HIC (high-income country), with no financial investment across bordcrs,just payments for traded goods and services. (Let's further a<;sumc that LIC ha<; some features of India and HIC ha<; some features of USA. I am using the distortion factor of 3.9 for India from Table 1 ; the rest in the following is "made up".)
Herc is a 2-country scenario ( Now let LL'l examine the implication of the distortion factor. The distortion factor in crossnational currency valuation is 3.9 (from Table 1 ). This means that the purchasing power rate (PPP rate) between LIC's rupee and HIC's dollar is not 20: 1 but, rather, 20/3.9 : 1 = 5.13 : 1. I am rounding this off to 5 : 1 .
When we a<;smnc that the PPP rate reflects the true value of the currency, then it can be observed that 
Journa I of World-Systems Research
A~ a percent of GDP, the gains and losses arc, a~ follows: LlC ha~ an "invisible loss" (unrecorded loss) of 150 rupees. With a GDP of 1200 rupees, the invisible loss of value is 150/1200 = 12.5% of GDP. HlC ha~ an "invisible gain" (unrecorded gain) of 30 dollars. With a GDP of 1010 dollars, the invisible gain of value is 30/1010 = 3.0% of GDP.
Ba~cd on this rca~oning, l conclude that the currency values of low-income countries tend to be undervalued. The effect is exploitative. The core countries appear to extract a large amount of value from the periphery countries through the clever monetary device called exchange rate system. Baboncs (1998) ha~ recently made a parallel observation with respect to global center-periphery relations, namely that: "Surplus value is not extracted solely through coercion, but also through the working of financial markets." (He is referring to credit markets.)
RECENT LITERATURE ON UNDERVALUATION
Undervaluation of currencies ha~ drawn some attention in the 1990s. ln a recent study, Havlik argues .fiJr currency undervaluation, stating with reference to countries in Central and Ea~tcrn Europe that "undervaluation is needed in order to overcome institutional, structural and quality deficiencies" (Havlik 1996) . Yotopoulos (1996) , however, argues against currency undervaluation in a book that combines theory, statistical-empirical research and ca~c studies. He uses purcha~ing power parity (PPP) data from World Bank sources, compares them with nominal exchange rates (NER) and calculates an exchange rate deviation index (ERD) for all countries (Yotopoulos 1996: 97-100). The study investigates the relationship between currency valuation and economic growth. His observations agree with mine in two important points --namely, Yotopoulos writes: (1) "free currency markets ... have an inherent distortion" (Yotopoulos 1996: ii) and (2) with reference to low-and middle-income countries: There is "undervaluation of the NER [sc. nominal exchange rate] ... Conventional wisdom, on the contrary, secs the problem a~ NER overvaluation ... "(Yotopoulos 1996: 8. Empha~is original)
THE QUANTIFICATION OF UNEQUAL EXCHANGE
The availability of PPP data and the possibility of calculating an exchange rate deviation index (variable "d" in Table 2 above; or "ERD" in Yotopoulos 1996) opens up an intriguing new way of quantifying the degree of "unequal exchange" (losses and gains from unfair center-periphery trade).
ln Emmanuel's theory the concept of "unequal exchange" is the grand dependent variable. ln his words: " ... unequal exchange is the proportion between equilibrium prices that is established through the equalization of profits between regions in which the rate of surplus value is 'institutionally' different..." (Emmanuel 1972: 64) .
This is a theoretical definition and not an operational definition. How unequal is the cxchangc9 How much value is unfairly transferred from the periphery to the ccntcr9 Raff er 1987: 194) That wa-, the state of affairs in the late l 980's. In the meantim e, a new type of data ha-, become w idely available, namely , the World Bank's PPP data which arc now available for a majorit y of countries. In combination with a structural view of global mone y, these data can be used for estimating the degree of unequal exchange. The following calculations for 1993 arc illustrati ve of such a possibility.
The proposed estimation method is , a-, follows: (a) calculate the distortion factor d (sec above, Tables 1 and 2 , or, a-, Yotopoulos calls it, the ERD --exchange rate deviation index) ; and (b) apply it to the vo lume of trade, giving (c) the loss or gain due to unequal exchan ge, according to the formula:
where:
T = magnitude of unrecorded transfer (loss or gain) due to unequal exchan ge X = volume of exports from a low-wage country to high-wag e countries, and d = the distortion factor (i.e. the deviation of th e nominal exchange rate from the PPP rate, also known a-, ERD)
The formula means, in words, that the unr ecorded transfe r (T) resulting from unequal exchange is equal to the difference between the fair value of the export ( d * X) and the unfair (actual) value of the export (X). For low-wage countries this magnitud e Tis a loss. For high-wage countries the same magnitude Tis a gain.
Hypothetical example: A low-income country ha.., exports to a high-wage country of X = $1000 and a distortion factor of d = 2.65 (which is average, sec Table 2 ). Inst ead of earning $1000 from exports, the country could have earned 2.65 * $1000 = $2650. Th e difference 2650 (fair value) -1000 (unfair value) = $1650 is the amount of unrec orded value lost by the low-wage country (and gained by the high-wag e country) due to unequal exchange. When Emmanuel first presented his idea.., (1962 and 1969/72) , PPP data were not available, so that this kind of quantification of the effects of unequal exchange wa.., not possible at the time.
ESTIMATES OF UNEQUAL EXCHANGE FOR 1993
This estimation method can be applied to export data for 1993. The export streams between center and periphery of the world arc shown in Table 3 : The figure to watch in Table 3 is "0.64". This represents the exports from the periph ery (all non-OECD countries ) to the center of the world system (OECD countri es) and shows periphery-to-center exports as US$ 0.64 trillion (or, $64 0 billion). When we value this volume of exports in terms of PPP rates, then the distortion factor of 2.65 (from above) can be applied as a first approximation. Given this preliminary assumption, th e fair value of the export flow of US $0.64 trillion can be valued a.., 0.64 * 2.65 = l.7 trillions of PPP dollars. If this is the fair value of the exports from low-and middle-income countri es to high-income countries, then the amount of income lost by low-and middle-incom e countries in 1993, due to unequal exchange, may be estimated a..,:
d*X X T (fair value) less (unfair value)= (loss due to unequal exchange) or, 1.7 0.64 1.06
In other words, in 1993 the loss incurred by low-and middle-income countries due to unequal exchange may have been 1.06 trillion of PPP dollars. At the same time , this is the estimated gain for OECD countries.
How does this figure compare with global GDP and the GDPs oflow-and high-incom e countries? The GDP figures for the world in 1993 are given in Table 4 : Table 5 shows similarities and discrepancies in the estimated percentages. Whether global exploitation incrcm,cdbctwccn 1966 and 1993, a..:; the table seems to sugges t , is difficult to answer since Amin's and my estimates arc ba..:;cd on two different methods. This problem requires further research. Howeve r, it can be observed that both met hod..:; lead to roughly comparable ma gnitudes. Furthermore, the figures arc consistent with Emmanuel's non-quanti tative statement --namely, that the "loss [sc. resulting from unequal cxchangc]. . .is enorm ous in relation to the poverty of the underdev eloped countries while being far from neg ligible in relation to the wealth of the advanced countries." (Emmanuel 1972: 265) 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF UNEQUAL EXCHANGE
In the history of science new instrum ents and new types of data hav e, on num erous occa..:;ions, led to inno vations in thcory--c.g., the invention of the telescope in a..:;tronomy; the invention of the microscope in biology; the development of co mput cr-ba..:; cd timcscrics analysis in economics , etc. Similarly, the availability of PPP data, which were not available in the 1960's and 1970's and not fully available in the 1980's, arc now addin g new insights to the theory of unequal exchange. The subtitle of Emmanuel's book "Unequal Exchange" is "A Study of the Imperialism of Trade", where trade refers to commodity trade, not currency tra de. With the help of now-a vailabl e PPP data, it becomes incrca..:;ingly apparent that the clement of unfairness or exploita tion in the notion of "unequal exchan ge" is not only a matter of unequal commodity exchan ge, but also a matter of unequal currency exchange, both be ing intricately linked .
Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange includ es the following views: (l) Trade between low-income and high-income countries (periphery and center of the world system) is unequal, meaning: unfair, bia..:;cd against the low-income countries.
(2) Wages in low-income countries arc undervalued in relation to wages in high-income countries.
(3) Export prices of exports from low-income countries arc undervalu ed in relation to the export prices of high-income countries.
(4) There is a relationship between the undervaluation of labour and the undervaluation of exports oflow-incomc countries. Emmanuel stresses that: " ... inequality of wages a..:; such, all other things being equal, is alone the cause of the inequality of exchange" (Emmanuel 1972: 61) and refers to wages a..:; "the independent variable of the system " (Emmanuel 1972: 64 ) .
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What causes the inequality of wages between high-wage and low-wag e countries? Herc Emmanuel discusses various possible influences --physiological wage, historical wage, market wage, equilibrium wage, moral clement, trade-union factor, wage zon es and so on. (Emmanuel 1972: 109-122) Generally, the problem is seen a..:; an "institutional" problem.
In terms of causal modelling, Emmanuel constructs a causal sequence fr om antecedent factors Al, A2, A3 etc. (called "determinants of wages"), which cause "inequalit y of wages" (X), which in turn is causing "unequal exchange of commodities" (Y). That is:
A--> X--> Y
An alternative causal view, ba..:;cd on a structural view of global mone y, is that the "undervaluation of a country's currency" ha..:; two simultaneous valuation effec ts a..:; a consequence of the distorted structure of global money (M): (X) it leads to an undervaluation oflabour in the low-income country relative to labour of high-income countries; and (Y) it leads to an undervaluation of the exports of the low-incom e country relativ e to the exports of high -incom e countries. That is:
Seen this way, the unfairness of commodity trade between low-wage and high-wage countries ("unequal exchange" in Emmanuel's sense) is , in part, caused by the structure of global money ("unequal excha nge" in the sense of "unequal exchang e rates"). The distortion of global money and of the exchange rate system is shaped by the historically grown structure of the world-system (center-periphery, imperialism, "global aparth eid" (Kohler 1978 (Kohler , 1995 ) and ideologically supported by ncocla-;sical international economic theory (favouring free I unregulated currency markets).
IMPLICATIONS FORPRAXJS
Unequal exchange theory supports an advocacy of labour struggle with the objective of raising the wages of workers in peripheral countries and/or an advocacy of global socialism, for example, along the lines of Amin's socialist polyccntrism (Amin 1994) . The structural view of global money suggests an additional strategy, which may be combined with the above strategics or pursued on its own, namely: a reform of the global exchange rate system in the direction ofpurcha-;ing power parity (PPP) rates. Such a reform would raise the wages oflow-income countries relative to high-income countries, a-; fought for by Emmanuel and others; it would improve the terms of trade for lowincomc countries, a-; fought for by Prcbisch and others; and it would significantly reduce unequal exchange.
How much each low-or middle-income country could gain from such a global monetary reform --and how much it is presently losing due to unequal exchange, can be seen from the World Tables of Unequal Exchange which arc presented in the Appendix below . These tables arc ba-;cd on the theory and method developed in this article.
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INTRODUCTION
The statistical tables below present quantitative estimates of unequal exchange for 119 countries. The tables arc ba~cd on the theory and method developed in the main body of the article. The calculations arc ba~cd on export/import data and the exchange rate deviation index. Losses or gains from unequal exchange arc calculated a~ the difference between a "fair value" of exports/imports and the "actual (unfair) value" of exports/imports. The estimation formula is:
T=d*X-X where d = the exchange rate deviation index (also designated a~ "ERD" in the literature) X = the volume of exports from a low-or middle-income country to high-income countries (valued at the actual exchange rate) T = the unrecorded transfer of value (gain or loss) resulting from unequal exchange
In the tables (below), this formula is applied to the data for I 19 countries for the year 1995. Table I presents the step-by-step calculations. Countries arc arranged in alphabetical order and in two groups --first, non-OECD countries and, secondly, OECD countries. The losses or gains from unequal exchange arc shown at the right-hand side (in terms of U.S. dollars and a~ a percent of the country's GNP). Table 2 presents the losses and gains (same a~ in Table I ), sorted by dollar volume. Table 3 presents the losses and gains (same a~ in Table I ), sorted by percent of GNP.
HOW TO READ THE TABLES
The tables arc followed by a brief discussion and further methodological details.
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